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Our featured article, “Solitary Confinement, Inmate Mental Health, and Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment:  An Ethical and Justice Policy Inquiry” appeared in a recent Special 
Edition of the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology, 3(2): 1-82, 2010.  
Before addressing the assorted responses to the article, we wish to thank our commentators 
for their thoughtful and insightful observations.  While some contributors more probingly 
examined important values such as dignity and empathy, others more directly questioned 
the need for a fundamental change in the public’s perception of offenders.  Given the 
compelling and critical interdisciplinary nature of our featured article and the published 
responses to it, we are grateful to the respective reviewers for their willingness to undertake 
such a meaningful scholarly exchange.  Collectively, the contributors helped to shed greater 
light on the psychological, legal, correctional, and philosophical complexities situated at the 
controversy’s core.   
Regrettably, time and space limitations do not permit us to address each of the 
commentators’ observations in detail. However, their principal concerns and criticisms do 
warrant some attention.  Among the responses, two pivotal themes emerged.  First, some   134 
commentators expressed reservations about the suitability or adequacy of virtue ethics as a 
guiding moral philosophy for judicial decision-making.  Second, a few authors articulated a 
degree of doubt about whether jurists would be amenable to our proposed virtue-guided 
decision-making logic and practice.  In addition to these key concerns, several distinct 
comments also were identified and they merit some further consideration by us.     
However, before discussing any of these matters, we wish to restate the main points 
of our article.  As previously delineated, the extant social and behavioral science literature 
on long-term disciplinary solitary confinement has repeatedly demonstrated that such 
isolation severely exacerbates the mental health conditions of psychiatrically disordered 
incarcerates (Haney, 2003; Kupers, 2008; Lovell, 2008; Rhodes, 2004, 2005).  Given that 
isolation policies continue to be sustained despite these troubling scientific findings, we first 
endeavored to determine the jurisprudential intent lodged within the prevailing case law on 
matters involving solitary confinement, inmates with pre-existing psychiatric conditions, and 
claims of cruel and unusual punishment.  Second, mindful of the leading schools of ethical 
thought (i.e., consequentialism and its variants consisting of ethical egoism, contractualism, 
and utilitarianism; formalism and its derivatives including Kantian deontology and prima 
facie duties; and Aristotelian virtue philosophy, especially feminist-inspired care ethics), our 
investigation sought to discern the moral rationale informing and shaping this intent.   
Interestingly, the results indicated that the court opinions largely failed to 
incorporate the current empirical body of research on solitary confinement when presiding 
judges reached their conclusions.  Further, the findings showed that the legal decision-
making of jurists was principally derived from utilitarian logic and, to some lesser degree, 
deontological principles.  We asserted that judicial temperament based on these moral 
philosophies sustains harmful policies that hinder healing and deny all individuals their more 
complete humanity.  
In response to the courts’ questionable (and misguided) underlying jurisprudential 
ethics, a novel practice agenda was provisionally recommended as a way to more fully   135 
address the problem of inmate mental health, solitary confinement, and cruel and unusual 
punishment.  As we explained, this agenda emerges from within the law, psychology, and 
justice framework and the theory of psychological jurisprudence (PJ) (Arrigo, 2004). This 
framework and theory consist of three virtue-inspired approaches to growing citizenship for 
and about one and all. These approaches or practices include commonsense justice, 
therapeutic jurisprudence, and restorative justice.  Taken together, these care-centric 
practices challenge agents of the criminal justice system (e.g., judges, attorneys, and legal 
psychologists) to dramatically rethink judicial decision-making.  Moreover, these approaches 
provide each affected party (i.e., those victimized, those who offend, and the communities 
to which both are connected) with the opportunity to heal and to flourish.  This, we argued, 
is how justice is made more realizable for a society otherwise ensconced in its own 
debilitating captivity (Arrigo & Milovanovic, 2009).  
Having delineated the main points of our article, we now return to the chief concerns 
and criticisms raised by the commentators.  As mentioned, several themes were identified 
among the responses.  The first of these involved virtue ethic’s sufficiency as a moral 
philosophy capable of significantly guiding legal decision-making.  In Acorn’s (2010) 
thoughtful critique, she asserted that utilitarian and deontological moral reasoning may yet 
still provide the best grounds for succeeding on Eighth Amendment claims, particularly 
when jurists honor inmates’ dignity.  Along these lines, Presser and Easterling asserted that 
utilitarian logic – in its purest form – could potentially lead to a “more caring criminal 
justice” system (2010, p. 84).  From the perspective of these reviewers, “utilitarianism does 
not necessarily ignore suffering” (2010, p. 86).  Taking exception to our normative 
assertions, Presser and Easterling explained that utilitarian calculations – if performed 
correctly – do not always result in one group’s interests being valued over another group’s 
needs. 
We agree that virtue ethics is flawed on multiple grounds. Consistent with this view, 
our article drew specific attention to McIntyre’s (2007) systematic and insightful analysis   136 
regarding human vice.  More importantly, though, Aristotelian (2000) virtue does celebrate 
dignity as an embodied habit of living excellently.  Aristotle’s meaning for dignity, steeped 
as it is in the uncertainty of following the golden mean’s path, does foreshadow Kant’s 
moral requirement that dignity’s imperative be categorical for one and about all. Unlike 
Kant, however, Aristotle’s prescription is that such universalizing (i.e., of dignity exercised 
responsibly) ought not to be experienced burdensomely (a vice of excess) but, instead, be 
inhabited lovingly as in being present to and for another’s humanness (Levinas, 1987. 
2004).   
Still further, living this quality of dignity understandably encompasses a kind of 
utilitarianism. This reasoned quality of seeking to embody dignity stems from the fact that 
one is forever weighing, calculating, and balancing the multi-faceted dimensions of 
respecting (dignifying) self and others. Then, too, much like any of Aristotle’s virtues, living 
through regard (as affirmation for one and of all) becomes embodied only when its use is 
regularly exercised (including the rehearsal of its varied measurements and estimates).  
Thus, mindful of virtue ethics limitations, we maintain that its normative practice offers the 
most promise for growing the flourishing interests (including dignity) of all individuals.  
Indeed, when respect is exhibited as a habit of character rather than as a prescribed 
obligation, a more genuine and unconditional affirmation of honoring another emerges. It is 
in this way, then, that we recognize virtue ethic’s efficacy as moral philosophy capable of 
renovating and innovating legal decision-making.   
Finally, while utilitarian formulations, even if performed as Presser and Easterling 
suggest, may result in outcomes that are collectively beneficial, consequentialist logic 
routinely guarantees that the interests of some individuals or collectives will be 
compromised or forfeited to advantage a larger group, a greater interest-consuming 
constituency.  Admittedly, utilitarianism “can be pressed into the service of care” (Presser & 
Easterling, 2010, p. 86). Nevertheless, virtue ethics provides a uniquely generative moral 
philosophical foundation wherein values such as autonomy, empathy, and compassion can   137 
function as lasting and ever-present components of care’s habit. Accordingly, for all of these 
reasons, we maintain that a virtue ethics sourced in Aristotelian moral philosophy goes 
much farther than its deontological and utilitarian counterparts in ensuring that every 
individual’s dignity and well-being is excellently and habitually celebrated.   
Given that the criminal justice system is principally guided by formalist and 
consequentialist logic, several commentators expressed some degree of reservation 
regarding how receptive judges would be to virtue-inspired and character-building judicial 
decision-making.  As Presser and Easterling noted, “Such an orientation [i.e., virtue ethics] 
is radically opposed to the utilitarian manner of reasoning” currently employed by jurists 
(2010, p. 84).  Along these lines, Kupers (2010) thoughtfully explained that, “Law is a 
conservative enterprise, more sensitive to public opinion and legislation than the Founding 
Fathers meant it to be” (p. 96).  He further emphasized that “until our society views 
prisoners as human beings deserving of an opportunity to do their time and return to their 
communities with a fair chance at "going straight," the courts are likely to continue their 
vacillations and limited rulings” (Kupers, 2010, p. 96).   
We most assuredly agree with these astute observations.  A shift toward maximizing 
human flourishing for and about one and all would represent a considerable undertaking for 
judicial decision-makers and, more problematically, for society in general.  We contend, 
however, that reliance on the three excellence-inspired PJ practices (i.e., commonsense 
justice, therapeutic jurisprudence, and restorative justice), offers the greatest potential to 
meaningfully and transformatively attend to the concerns raised by the commentators.  As 
we noted in our recent collaborative work, delinquent, troubled, and/or vulnerable offenders 
are regularly deemed to be other or less than fully human (Arrigo, Bersot, & Sellers, 2011).  
These disturbing characterizations fuel and sustain policies that wrongly demonize, 
pathologize, and criminalize citizens. Among other outcomes, the fall-out from such 
objectification (and commodification) is to legitimize confinement (e.g., long-term 
disciplinary segregation) for incarcerates with pre-existing psychiatric conditions.  As such,   138 
those who offend, those victimized, and the communities to which both are inexorably 
bound remain altogether fractured, disconnected, and held captive by such limit-setting.   
It is our view that the three virtue-based practices of psychological jurisprudence 
allow for a more organic reconciliation process to unfold in which the personal harm 
resulting from violence and the shared injury suffered in its aftermath are made speakable 
(Arrigo et al., 2011).  To illustrate, commonsense justice engages the aggrieved community 
in discussions regarding widely-held misconceptions about those who commit crimes.  Such 
exchanges are crucial to transforming current “habits” of fear, retribution, and isolation into 
habits of courage, forgiveness, and connectedness. Similar efforts to recover and to heal in 
the wake of victimization are a part of restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence. 
Thus, the implementation of these three PJ practices suggests a tangible way to overcome 
suffering and to transcend harm so that the fabric that unites us all can be virtuously 
restored. This is a quality of change in the public’s psyche that is vital to reforming both our 
collective conscience and its regard for the character of citizenship and social justice. 
Aside from our assessment of the above thematic points, a number of distinct 
comments also warrant attention.  Among them is Acorn’s assertion that citizenship can 
only be extended to those capable of virtue.  As she explained, “nothing in the Nicomachean 
ethics would suggest that the vicious person, one who has done base rather than noble 
deeds, could not be deprived of the privileges of citizenship and society” (Acorn, 2010, p. 
113).  According to Acorn, “For Aristotle, neither the bad nor the mad come within the logic 
of either citizenship or virtue” (p. 114).   
Cognizant of Aristotelian logic, we acknowledge that certain individuals (i.e., 
offenders and the mentally ill) may be deemed unworthy of citizenship or incapable of 
developing moral fiber.  But this is where we extend Aristotle’s rationale in the interest of 
the potential that virtue itself holds (see Levinas, 1987, 2004).  Indeed, we suggest that a 
deeper quality of citizenship – one that is all-inclusive – is sorely needed (Arrigo et al., 
2010).  The possibility of leading a life of excellence must be available to everyone as a   139 
human right, particularly those most troubled and/or vulnerable (i.e., offenders and the 
mentally ill). These are citizens whose humanness historically has been reduced (i.e., 
denials of one’s possible being) and repressed (i.e., limits on one’s potential becoming).  
Admittedly, we understand that this notion of affirming citizenship as a universal human 
right presents a number of thorny challenges.  Nevertheless, we maintain that anything less 
than an extension of citizenship to all individuals diminishes prospects for dynamic 
self/society flourishing. The absence of such a condition is how captivity dangerously 
endures; we are rendered no more than a “shadow” of our humanness and its 
transformative potential (Arrigo & Milovanovic, 2009) 
Elsewhere, Acorn (2010) questioned the robustness of the qualitative method 
developed for and employed in our study.  As she intimated:  
“Much of Bersot and Arrigo’s text is taken up with an explanation of their 
methodology, their choice of cases to examine as well as their method of extracting 
the moral philosophical assumptions informing the judges’ reasoning; their manner 
of bringing the disciplinary rigors of the social sciences to bear on the analysis of 
judicial decisions. However, one has the sense that the detailed discussion of method 
is an attempt to give the appearance of greater precision than is actually attainable 
in this kind of inquiry” (p. 115).   
Citing Aristotle’s discussion on precision, Acorn argued that, “Bersot and Arrigo may 
perhaps be accused of being rhetoricians who offer scientific proofs and the difficulty here is 
not just that they pretend to a precision that cannot be attained in this type of inquiry” 
(2010, pp. 115-116). 
As we repeatedly acknowledged in our featured article, the selected method was 
novel and experimental.  Moreover, as we explained, its qualitative footing, although 
systematic, was clearly interpretive in design.  Examining jurisprudential intent in order to 
determine the underlying moral logic identifiable in judicial opinions is an imprecise, but 
certainly heuristic, process of data mining.     140 
Accordingly, we contend that the method developed and utilized in our featured 
article is a preferred way of beginning to discern the unstated ethical reasoning guiding 
judicial decision-making.  As we noted, case law inquiries employing other qualitative 
methods, including statutory analysis, rely solely on meaning.  Meaning must be interpreted 
mindful of its context, and this context varies according to how the juridical language (i.e., 
legalese) is construed (Posner, 2008).  Thus, we maintain that what makes our two-phase 
methodology so compelling (ascertaining jurisprudential intent followed by explicating the 
intent’s underlying moral philosophy) is that it begins to unpack the multi-layered facets of 
the meaning making/generating process located within legal texts (case or statutory law). 
Stated differently, our approach makes it “possible to go beyond the surface meaning of 
legal texts [manifest content] to explore the structure and the ideological content… [and in 
doing so] to search for the values expressed by the law (Mercuro & Medema, 1998, p. 169).  
From our perspective, the rigor implied in this investigatory undertaking renders our 
method – while provisional in nature –a more thorough strategy for exposing and dissecting 
the concealed ethical rationale directing judicial decision-making.          
      
We now turn to two distinct lines of critique raised by Ward (2010).  One of his 
concerns focused on our lack of discussion regarding punishment.  As Ward asserted, “A 
difficulty with the Bersot and Arrigo discussion is that they tend to speak about Formalism 
and Consequentialism as ethical theories rather than as specify them as justifications of 
punishment (2010, p. 102).  As he further explained, “a more explicit and helpful move 
would be to appeal to a specific theory of punishment that is consistent with both PJ and 
virtue theory” (Ward, 2010, p. 102).  For this, Ward suggested Duff’s (2001) communicative 
theory of punishment.   
We did not specifically describe the ethical philosophies of formalism and 
consequentialism as rationales for legally sanctioned punishment. However, this was an 
implicit dimension of the article’s overall normative analysis. Thus, we most definitely agree 
with Ward’s observation here.  Still further, we agree with his assessment regarding the   141 
relevance of Duff’s (2001) communicative theory.  Indeed, it effectively links a theory of 
punishment with virtue-infused PJ practices that seek to overcome and transcend retributive 
harm. This is a useful association that future researchers would do well to explore 
theoretically and empirically.   
Another concern for Ward was what he perceived to be our limited application of 
virtue theory.  He suggested that we consider how “the culture of a community or an 
institution might facilitate the flourishing and well-being of individuals through the nature of 
its policies and practices independently of the character traits of the individuals who work, 
or live, within it” (Ward, 2010, p. 106).  He also argued that epistemic or intellectual virtues 
that increase knowledge and understanding (e.g., cognitive flexibility, curiosity, and 
tolerance) should be examined.   
We recognize that our article is limited in its assessment and application of virtue.  
Indeed, we share in Ward’s contention that communal and institutional policies and 
practices must be reevaluated in order to determine if and in what way they promote 
human flourishing as well as honor individual (and collectivist) well-being.  This deeper level 
of critique is the source of analysis that is more expansively undertaken in our recent book-
length collaborative effort.  This work is described briefly below. What follows is a 
considerable reformulation of virtue ethics and its possibilities for dynamically and 
transformatively re-conceiving the nexus of madness, citizenship, and social justice.   
Why are destructive policies, including the long-term disciplinary segregation of 
incarcerates with pre-existing psychiatric disorders legally endorsed?  Grounded in a 
seemingly inexhaustible and uncontainable fear of crime (Simon, 2009), threat-
management practices comprising excessive investments in hyper-vigilance and panoptic 
disciplining (Foucault, 1977) are understood to be normal and necessary responses to 
perceived violence.  This questionable logic is indicative of the ominous risk society (Beck, 
1992, 2009).  This is a society that eliminates or neutralizes any and all potential hazards in 
the service of a mostly unreflective commitment to personal security (economic or   142 
otherwise) as a maximally efficient path to democratic human progress. Thus, “[in] order to 
stave off the possibility of future imagined violence and victimization [possible impediments 
to such progress], the public demands governance (institutional responses to such conjured 
terror)” (Arrigo et al., 2011).  
While the declared purpose of threat-avoidance practices (i.e., solitary confinement 
of psychiatrically disordered incarcerates), is to protect the public (those who work and/or 
live within prisons), we maintain that they also hold captive far more citizens than those 
perceived to be dangerous.  These are institutional choices and actions that capture not only 
the kept (the confined), but their keepers (those who confine), managers (i.e., judicial and 
penal administrators of confinement) and their watchers (i.e., the anesthetized public).  In 
essence then, we are all imprisoned by these maddening practices, especially when we 
dismiss, ignore, or rewrite the scientific evidence on which these restrictive choices and 
actions are based.   
Thus, drawing upon the notion of total confinement as developed from Goffman’s 
(1961) appraisal of total institutions and Arrigo and Milovanovic’s (2009) reinterpretation of 
the society of captives, we articulated an innovative model for understanding this culture of 
imprisonment.  In our work, The Ethics of Total Confinement:  A Critique of Madness, 
Citizenship, and Social Justice (Arrigo et al, 2011) we extended the analysis established in 
our article on inmate isolation, and examined two additional threat-avoidance practices. 
These additional practices included juveniles waived to and adjudicated within the adult 
system and the total confinement of formerly incarcerated sexual (and violent) offenders.  
We systematically uncovered how institutions, by way of their respective agents, act as 
“totalizing apparatuses” (Arrigo, 2004, p. vii; see also Arrigo et al., 2011).  These systems 
exercise a kind of social control that normalizes violence for the kept and their keepers as 
well as their managers and watchers.  This violence is the power to materially and/or 
existentially harm – it reduces, represses, and, consequently, injures all individuals caught 
up in this limit-setting cycle of normalized violence (Arrigo et al., 2011; see also Henry &   143 
Milovanovic, 1996).  As such, the reflection, choice, and action that nurtures and sustains 
total confinement practices (e.g., solitary confinement for psychiatrically disordered 
inmates) is nothing short of totalizing madness (Arrigo et al., 2011).                  
In order to overcome this maddening captivity, a type of citizenship and a quality of 
(social) justice was proposed that affirms the humanity and honors the dignity of all 
subjects. This ethic was sourced in novel theory, method, and practice.  Our perspective on 
citizenship and social justice represented not only a paradigmatic shift in how we imagine, 
speak about and grasp who we are (or could be), but in what we do (or could do).  Thus, 
the madness that we diagnosed necessitated a de/reconstruction so that citizenship could 
itself be dis/reassembled, and the search for social justice could itself be dis/reengaged 
(Arrigo et al., 2011).  This project of growing dynamic transformations pours into the 
realms of theory, method, and praxis.   
As theory, we explained that there are four spheres of interdependent and 
overlapping influence that sustain captivity’s madness.  These spheres shape and are 
influenced by the self/society mutuality (the twin dynamics). The Symbolic sphere is the 
realm of consumerism. It involves the “consumption of a particular and dominant aesthetic 
(pictures in our minds) regarding vulnerable, troubled, and distressed individuals; those 
professionals whose expertise includes treatment, corrections, and societal reentry; and the 
interventions exercised to ameliorate offenders and the offended” (Arrigo et al., 2011).  The 
Linguistic sphere is the realm of politics. It includes summary representations that when 
constructed create a text about offenders that frequently tell only the story of their 
deviance, disease, and dangerousness.  The Material sphere is the realm of technology.  
Here, the favored text (i.e., the narrative of mental health law) “endorses systems of 
(bodies of) knowledge in psychiatry, penology, social work, education, and the like” that 
discipline (i.e., correct) the self/society mutuality on the systems’ own reductive/repressive 
terms and through their own limit-setting technologies (Arrigo et al., 2011).  The Cultural 
sphere is the realm of cosmopolitism. It consists of the replication and distribution of   144 
images, texts, and technologies about the self/society mutuality that sustain captivity.  
Collectively, these forces of control (and their corresponding hyper-vigilant and panoptic 
intensities) await destabilization. This is how overcoming captivity’s madness is initiated. 
As method, the co-productive and mutually supporting influences of consumerism, 
politics, technology, and cosmopolitanism necessitate further textual investigation.  This 
future empirical inquiry would reveal a deeper level of “evidence about the quality of dignity 
(for one and all?), the type of healing (individual, collective, and social?), and the nature of 
critique (Aristotelian-derived?), located within and communicated through legal decisions” 
(Arrigo et al., 2011).  For example, does the prevailing case law explored in our article on 
solitary confinement reveal any instances in which habits of character such as courage were 
promoted, and, if so, for whom?  
  Moreover, at the level of PJ practice, constructs such as “fairness,” “dignity,” “the 
therapeutic,” “restorative,” “self,” and “society,” are all presently “filtered through the 
intemperance that…captivity most assuredly guarantees” (Arrigo et al., 2011).  In order to 
advance a more robust regard for social justice, the symbolic, linguistic, material, and 
cultural meanings that inform these constructs also must be the source of critique.  Indeed, 
as we maintained in our book, “to speak of growing dignity, healing, care, restoration, and 
community as artifacts of praxis made more realizable by way of psychological 
jurisprudence, is to question the very basis on which these constructs are given preferred 
aesthetical, epistemological, ethical, and ontological grounding” (Arrigo et al., 2011).  In 
this way, habits of character as transformative have the greatest potential to materialize, 
and social justice as dynamic praxis has the most promise for fulfillment.    
If a moral philosophy is to emerge in response to and prevail over the ethics of total 
confinement, nothing less than a revolution must occur.  As our book makes evident, deep 
and systematic reforms sensitive to re-diagnosing madness, re-advancing citizenship, and 
re-visiting social justice are all of the utmost importance. These reforms extend from legal 
education to clinical/mental health training and practice, from academic research to   145 
human/social welfare programming and policy.  Our challenge, then, is to begin the journey 
to overcome the normative constraints of total confinement.  This is an awaiting and 
pulsating revolution.  It is a departure from which change will spark yet unrealized 
self/society flourishing.   
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